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Abstract
In order to achieve the dream of construction Chinese 
harmony society which proposed by Chinese government, 
the Confucian thought which influenced China more than 
2000 years might be inevitable and the image of Confucius 
gradually became to a powerful cultural symbol when the 
rapid of modernization caused the moral and social issue 
in China. The heritage of Confucian ethos still affects the 
authorities that the “ritual” has occupied a crucial position 
especially the cult and sacrifice of Confucius. The revival 
of Confucian ceremony at Qufu Confucius temple has 
shifted in significance from the official religion and 
Confucian philosophy to one of political symbols of the 
CCP.
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INTRODUCITON
The revival of Confucian ceremony at Qufu Confucius 
temple has shifted in significance from the official 
religion and Confucian philosophy to one of political 
symbols of the CCP. This revival at the temple is used 
to ensure political loyalty in the inner CCP and establish 
cultural authority, but the effect of this revival is still 
struggling with the conversion between Confucian ritual 
and practical reality because of the deconstruction of 
Confucianism during the May Fourth movement and in 
the 1960s and. Moreover, it should not be ignored that 
the diversity of community culture is established by ritual 
teachings of popular organization in terms of Confucian 
ceremony revival.
1.  THE BACK OF “CONFUCIUS CITY” 
After the 1980s’ reform, the rapid economic growth in 
mainland China led to the emergence of latent moral crisis 
and the decline of Marxism. After a decade of ruthless 
crackdown on “class enemies” without clear definition, 
and the destruction of heritage without generating a 
more promising culture, what remained in society were 
fear and disillusion. In order to ensure the Party-State’s 
legitimacy, the revival of traditional Chinese culture 
such as Confucian ritual was gradual endorsed by the 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Wu, 
2014, p.971; Chan, 2016, p. 89; Tang, 2017). Among 
series Confucian rituals, the Confucian ceremony, which 
is used to sacrifice to the Chinese philosopher Confucius 
(551-479 BC), plays a crucial role to indicate the political, 
economic and cultural elements of Confucian rituals led 
by the CCP in attempts to establish political loyalty and 
maintain social stability. (Yan & Bill, 2008, p.971; Flath, 
2016; Murray, 2009, p.372). The CCP listed Confucian 
ceremony at the temple as part of “national intangible 
cultural heritage” in 2006 (Yan and Bill: 2008). The 
official definition of this ceremony is a series of inherited 
performances of music, dance and rites lasting from Sept 
26 to Oct 10 at Confucius temple in Qufu, Shandong 
province. (ihChina: 2006). However, it is obvious that 
other parts of this ceremony are omitted. According to 
research by Billioud and Thoraval (2009), the whole 
Confucian ceremony at the temple comprises the political 
discourses and Confucius festival organized by official 
organs (guan fang). Yet different sorts of small-scale 
Confucian ceremony were also held by common people 
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(min jian). Qufu is the hometown of Confucius, after his 
death, temple in Qufu was established., many emperors 
and other visitors came to the temple to hold grand 
ceremonies to sacrifice to Confucius. The temple and 
many descendants of Confucius still exist in this city. The 
CCP have conceived to formulate the model on Jerusalem 
to develop this Qufu city as “an eastern sacred city” in 
recent years (Billioud & Thoraval, 2009, p.86). 
2.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORM AND 
FUNCTION OF CONFUCIUS CEREMONY 
FROM IMPERIAL TO MODERN CHINA IN 
OFFICIAL NARRATIVE
Traditional dance, music and rites are performed through 
this resurrection of Confucian ceremony at the temple. 
This complex ceremony which is mainly intended to 
praise Confucius’ merits, inherits the Ming dynasty’s 
ceremonial standard but have many changed in forms. 
This ceremony included music, dance, rites and songs 
patterns from past to present. (Wilson, 2002; Flath, 
2016; Murray, 2009). The 2017 Confucian ceremony at 
the temple (ECNS, 2017) presents means to considerer 
forms and compare the past and present of this ceremony 
in general. Firstly, in this process, the cult of dance 
was regulated to imitate “the eight rows” dance by the 
authority, to compare with the past, it was no fixed 
regulation for the cult of dance, the emperors could 
choose the six or eight rows dance based on Confucian 
rituals’ text and their own favors. (Wilson, 2002). Then, 
the sacrificial offering is simpler than the past. From the 
Han dynasty to present, the “three animals (pig, ox and 
goat) sacrifice” was the major part of oblation. But in 
recent years, offering the silks and peaches to Confucius 
has been oblation instead of animals. some officials have 
offered a large basket of flowers during this ceremony. 
(Chen, 2017). Subsequently, the sacrificial music was 
“Shao” music, Confucius’ favorite. It was played by 
many traditional Chinese instruments such as chimes and 
zither (Wilson, 2002). In 2017’s Confucian ceremony, 
the sacrificial music was recomposed. When the city gate 
opened, a modern symphony was played; The singers and 
dancers were temporarily hired from chorus and students. 
Finally, the sacrificial texts have undergone huge change. 
Before the CCP’s reform, traditional sacrificial texts were 
fixed. They were normally coordinated with the cult of 
dance. Under the CCP’s reinterpretation of this section, 
some social elites, officials or public property were 
appointed to write the texts (Falth, 2016). For example, 
Confucian ceremony of 2017, the vice chairman of china 
cultural union Pan Lusheng wrote the sacrificial texts and 
the province’s governor read it at the start of ceremony. 
(ECNS, 2017)
These aspects of changes in ceremony forms and 
contents indicate that the CCP’s lead of Confucian 
ceremony at the temple have been revived in politically 
controlled grab. Lasswell’s “politics’” theory uses the 
term “political symbol” to denote a tool of any social 
elites to protect and keep power for itself. For example, 
the sanctioned words or gesture used by the elite could 
exploit the work force or taxes. Moreover, this symbol 
could be intended in grabbing people’s emotion for 
protecting the legitimacy of regime (Lasswell, 1950). 
Much of the Chinese historical political stability was 
founded on feudalism a political order of per dynasties. 
That imperial society was guided by traditional political 
symbols such as Confucian rituals that emphasized respect 
for society’s rulers and elders and morality in personal 
relationships. Confucian ceremony was highly influential 
in that era, it could be a political symbol to create the 
political identification. However, to continue to implement 
this symbol in modern China, the first issue to face the 
CCP is giving Confucian ceremony a proper position by 
CCP after the last suppression of Confucianism in the 
1960s (Billioud & Thoraval, 2009). But the reason for the 
revival was not only political. Yan and Bill (2008) explore 
Confucian ceremony in the temple’s changing fortunes as 
related to local tourism. After several experiments with 
the “Confucius hometown travel project”, in 2005the local 
cultural administration attempted to negotiate a revival of 
this ceremony with the central government as a “public 
cult ceremony”. The ceremony later came under criticism 
from some East Asian countries which declared that the 
same Confucian ceremony in Qufu was “inauthentic”. At 
the same time, some domestic scholars and descendants 
of Confucius argued that ceremony at the temple should 
be more traditional and authentic for development of 
tourism in the future. (Yan & Bill, 2008, p.982) Hence the 
revival of Confucian ceremony at the temple is no longer 
the exclusive preserve of emperors and social elites; it has 
become part of cultural consumption for tourists in the 
present. To comparison with the past, since Han dynasty, 
it had been originally for the emperors and descendants 
of Confucius to show homage to Confucius at the temple, 
the Confucius was respected as a sage, the most senior of 
his descendants in each generation has been also ennobled 
the duke of Perpetuating the Sage (Murray, 2009; 
Wilson, 2002, p.63). these continuous revivals in the 
sacrificial scales visually upgraded the “uncrowned king” 
Confucius to the level of an emperor. In the Ming dynasty, 
Confucius icons and sacrifices were banned but in Qufu 
the family sacrifice was still held by the descendants of 
Confucius (Murray, 2009). The image of this ceremony 
is different today. The domestic mainstream media such 
as the People’s Daily reported “Confucianism needed to 
be transformed and re-packaged so as to ‘advance with 
the times’” (Wu, 2014). The ceremony today promotes 
Confucius’ image into a “thinker” or “educator” that the 
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authorities continue to portray today. At the same time, 
some segments of society now refer to Confucius as a 
cultural symbol embodying self-cultivation. Confucius 
also sometimes acquires the status of a cultural hero or 
emblem of “cultural China”. Finally, he has also become 
a tourist icon and focus of economic profits (Billioud & 
Thoraval, 2009). Above all, this is the image of Confucian 
ceremony at this temple promoted by CCP.
3.  THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
OF CONFUCIUS CEREMONY IN THE 
CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS
In political contexts, Confucian rituals are one of political 
philosophy of Confucianism initially which reflect the 
rulers’ merits and measurement of officials’ test instead 
of a latest revival attempt of CCP to ensure the political 
loyalty. From Thomas (2017)’s analysis in early Confucian 
works such as Analects and Xunzi, the functions of 
Confucian rituals are more like the responsibility for 
both rulers and officials. In this ritual system, the ruler 
used the ritual as a tool to display his following the 
traditional merits that people can measure their rulers. It is 
theoretical that the ruler’s inspection of his subordinates’ 
cultivation through their ritual performance. Even 
the ruler emerged with the moral defects, it could be 
modified by his officials (Thomas, 2017, p.8). Following 
Lasswell’s theory, this political symbol could be valued 
for government to seize public emotion and alter public 
attitudes towards the party (Lasswell, 1950, p.427). 
Theoretically, since China is in a single-party system, the 
CCP could easily conduct propaganda policies, with the 
aim of perpetuating the legitimacy of its regime through 
the revival of this ceremony.
In recently years, the CCP has not fully revived 
Confucian rituals, because in imperial China, Chinese 
society could have been put in order without rule by 
law. One important thing to note is that Confucian ritual 
propriety has sustained the root of law (Chen, 2001) 
and Confucian officials have consistently asserted to 
suppress the merchants, levied heavy taxes on them, and 
forbade them from taking the civil service examinations 
and becoming officials (Tan, 2015, p.93) But nowadays, 
China is full of political factions and corruption because 
of lack of rule by law, but need the ritual propriety 
which includes the moral education to support the not 
yet completed rule by laws (Tan, 2015, p,99). Some 
Confucian classics’ sentences, which record that officials 
should be disinterested, were adopted as the teaching 
material of party school (dangxiao) to resist the mid and 
grass-root party member’s corruption (Billioud, 2010), 
Furthermore, the intra-party cadres needed to encourage 
and remobilize. As The party itself had become “an 
organization without energy”, lacking an “energizing 
ideology motivating its members to excel at public 
service and suffer personal sacrifice”. (Ford, 2015) With 
the related revival at Confucius temple in Qufu, the 
major character of Confucian ceremony has changed. 
Before the start of the ceremony, the leader of local 
government such as mayor of Qufu conducted the speech 
which repeat the political slogan from the party’s past 
important conferences to emphasize the political loyalty 
(Sun, 2015). Yet this revival of Confucian ceremony 
at the temple could enhance the regime’s legitimacy to 
a certain extent. In particular, both the Yuan and Qing 
dynasties used a revival of Confucian practice to enhance 
their regimes’ legitimacy. (Flath, 2016, p.107) The rulers 
of the Yuan and Qing dynasties realized that Confucian 
rituals did not discriminate against their foreign ethnicity, 
so the Confucian ceremony was a perfect junction with 
a past not their own. For example, the Kangxi Emperor 
achieved a remarkable compromise in reviving the 
custom of the imperial tour and introducing a full “three 
kneelings and nine prostrations” as the standard salutation 
during the Confucian ceremony at the temple. The rulers 
of Qing promoted this ceremony in order to reach the 
ruling court’s legitimacy and attract Confucian officials 
(Huang, 1998). The CCP has also encountered internal 
challenges to legitimacy, including persisting insecurities 
about subversion of its ideals from the ‘spiritual pollution’ 
of political ideals such as 1990s’ Tiananmen students’ 
campaign (Ford, 2015), in order to defense the West—the 
Chinese Party-State has increasingly ‘Orientalized’ itself 
and its political discourse. During the Confucian ceremony 
and Confucius cultural festivals at Qufu which CCP so-
called their officials’ activities, as Lam (1998) suggests, 
from the scale of a country governing its sacrifice, the 
ability of country controlling the public resources and 
the powerful authority were indicated indirectly. This 
situation can be related to the Confucian ceremony. Rigid 
control over the ceremony highlights the CCP’s cultural 
and political discourses as divided into three aspects. 
Firstly, the CCP is the patron of many “cultural units 
(wen hua dan wei)”. These organizations are registered 
by common people or social organizations, but the CCP 
runs them behind the scenes (Alex, 2016). For example, 
Murray (2009) records that the changes of Confucius’ 
image from past to present. In 2006, the standard portrait 
of Confucius was replaced by the China Confucius 
Foundation (COF) which is a public-raising foundation 
receiving funds from the CCP. Secondly, this ceremony is 
broadcast by national media (Sun, 2015). Soldiers guard 
the Confucius temple to keep order and many children 
stand in main sacrificial square to read the Analects in 
unison. Other social organizations are not allowed to hold 
ceremonies at this temple that day (Billioud & Thoraval, 
2009). Thirdly, the Confucius cultural festival after 
this ceremony is also a tool for CCP to control political 
discourse. The CCP evokes the official scholars at Qufu 
to take part in the ceremony’s discourse, these scholars 
pick the Confucianism which the part can enhance CCP’s 
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legitimacy (Flath, 2016; Billioud & Thoraval, 2009). 
Last but not least, according to Alex (2016)’s research 
on social cultural organizations in Qufu, the CCP limits 
the actions of many social religious organizations such 
as Christianity groups in many ways. However, although 
the Confucius ritual teaching groups have risen rapidly 
in recent years, there is a stronger ‘social imperative’ to 
diffuse Confucianism in order to defend against foreign 
culture and protect national tradition. (Alex, 2016, p.3).
In the result of CCP’s economic, cultural and 
propaganda policies about this revival of ceremony, 
President Xi Jinping gave a speech on “regaining cultural 
self-confidence” in which he insisted on supervising 
and urging every level of the CCP to revive prominent 
traditional Chinese cultural practices and rituals (People’s 
daily, 2016). This revival of Confucianism lasts from the 
beginning of 20th century, because the leaders of CCP 
are aware that if their citizens continually deny traditional 
culture, the next generation will have no roots in 
traditional cultural identification, exhibit more skepticism 
and awareness of the evil in human nature (Chan, 2016, 
p.4). In 2017, the Shandong province has highlighted 
the “Core Socialist Values” education which emphasized 
traditional culture, revolutionary history, and ideology. 
The local government also made the compulsory class of 
traditional culture for basic education. (Sixth Tone, 2018). 
However, it is hard to control this ceremony. In the 
eyes of the CCP, Confucianism may be a valuable source 
of legitimacy to strengthen its rule, filling the ideological 
void left by Marxism. Some commentators have 
expressed concern that Confucius, and more generally, 
overemphasizing the Confucian ceremony is already being 
politicized turning into a dangerous public obsession that 
will lead to cultural chauvinism (Ho, 2009). But the CCP 
is still struggling with its revival of this ceremony because 
of people’s distrust. Firstly, the CCP was deconstructing 
the Confucianism in 1960s, especially the Confucian 
ceremony, it had been seen the superstitious action in 
cultural revolution (Zhang & Schwartz, 1997), even in 
Kang Youwei’s Confucius church which he wanted the 
Confucianism to be the national religious to counter 
the western religious invade (Chen, 2016), but the new 
cultural movement and May Fourth campaign contained 
the Kang’s revival, the leaders of new cultural movements 
encourage people to strike down the Confucianism 
because the Confucian ceremony stranded for Feudal 
restoration (Flath, 2016). Secondly, Huang (1998) 
argued that the Confucianism is the “public religious”, 
to be corresponded with the ceremony, the sacrificial 
texts which read the temple always concerns about the 
flourishing country and the social stability rather than 
the personal happiness (Huang, 1998). So, the ceremony 
is not very useful for people to get individual blessings 
such as with shamans or in Buddhism. They only take part 
in this ceremony after coercion from political authority. 
Otherwise, some local Confucius organizations actually 
follow this revival to do these ritual teachings (Alex, 
2016), although some local ritual teaching organizations 
just concentrated on commercial profit, the connivance 
of the official with sympathetic participation is indirectly 
monitoring (Billioud & Throval, 2009); many people 
still think the ritual teaching is no help for their children 
to access university entrance examinations (control., 
2017, p.170). Moreover, the abuse of tourism resources 
is another reason that people do not accept the revival 
of Confucian ceremony. The local government of Qufu 
destroyed many historical buildings outside the three 
Kong science spot to construct tourist centers and hotels 
(Yan & Bill, 2008; Flath, 2016). The local government 
might keen for speedy economic success, but it has 
already provoked some international tourism to reject 
the cultural consumption. Therefore, at this stage, the 
CCP cannot completely control this use of this revival, as 
Flath (2016) argued that it must be sensed that the whole 
ceremony was not fully manipulated of the performers, 
and could even create profound dilemmas for its clients in 
remaining perpetually open to investment, contradiction, 
and “regulation by excess”. But under the background 
of CCP’s lead of Confucian ceremony revival, using the 
Confucian rituals frequently may stand for decency and 
honor that confer an element that is ‘soft’ and persuasive, 
rather than violently repression. the quick speed of 
the spread of popular ritual teachings could enrich the 
community life.
CONCLUSION
To sum up, the CCP is eager to search the ‘reasonable 
core’ of Confucianism and adopt it in its moral and 
cultural construction. In recent years, Besides the 
more “traditional” and “authentic” continue revival of 
Confucian ceremony which the CCP has declared to 
enhance its cultural legitimacy, Chinese Party-State also 
desires to establish a sort of ideological battle field by 
this revival, attempting to resist the western culture. In 
the future, the research of Confucian ceremony will be 
enriched if the CCP still insists the traditional culture 
resurgence. But there is one that should be alert that 
stifling standardization of CCP’s interpretation Confucius 
ceremony might be so politicization that the effect of this 
revival might be reduced.
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